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Incentive-based travel demand management strategies are gaining increasing attention as 
they are generally considered more acceptable by the traveling public and policymakers.  
There is limited evidence on the impacts of such schemes, and the complex behavioral 
traits that may affect how individuals respond to incentives aimed at shifting travel away 
from peak period driving.  This study presents a detailed analysis and modeling effort 
aimed at understanding how incentives affect traveler choices using data collected from a 
reward-based scheme conducted in 2006 in The Netherlands. The incentive scheme 
analyzed in this study gave monetary reward or credits for smartphone thus nudging 
commuters to avoid peak period driving by alternative time of travel or mode choice. The 
mixed panel multinomial logit modeling approach adopted in this study is able to isolate 
the impacts of incentives on behavioral choices while accounting for variations in such 
impacts across socio-economic groups that may be due to unobserved individual 
preferences and constraints.  The model also sheds light on the effects of behavioral 
inertia, where individuals are inclined to continue their past behavior even when it is no 
longer optimal.  Finally, the study offers insights on the extent to which behavioral 
changes persist after the end of the incentive period.  In general, it is found that incentives 
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are effective in changing behavior and can overcome inertial effects; however, 
individuals largely revert to their original behavior when the rewards are eliminated, thus 
suggesting that incentives need to be provided for a sustained period to bring about 
lasting change.   
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CHAPTER 1:  BACKGROUND 
Traffic congestion is an issue that metropolitan regions around the world seek to address 
through a variety of travel demand management (TDM) strategies.  In the United States, 
it is estimated that Americans experienced a total delay of 5.5 billion hours in 2011 due 
to traffic congestion. This extra travel time contributed to an additional 2.9 billion gallons 
of fuel consumption and an economic impact (loss) of $121 billion (Schrank et al., 2012). 
In addition to delays and adverse economic consequences, traffic congestion leads to 
poorer air quality (Shafer, 1994), substandard health among infants born to mothers 
living near congested corridors (Currie and Walker, 2009), and delays in evacuation and 
emergency response (Litman, 2006).   
 To address traffic congestion that largely occurs during peak periods in most 
metropolitan regions, planning agencies have been attempting to deploy travel demand 
management strategies that would help eliminate or temporally and spatially shift trips 
away from congested periods and corridors. Peak period congestion, which is often 
associated with the commuting hours of the morning and afternoon, is generally the target 
of such travel demand management strategies – although such strategies may also be 
applied in the context of travel to and from special events, travel around work zones, and 
travel around major tourist attractions and destinations (example, natural parks). Some of 
the best practices that travel demand management strategies may take are in the form of 
congestion pricing, incentives to shift travel to off-peak periods or alternative 
uncongested corridors, flexible work hours, telecommuting, transit subsidies, and ride-
sharing programs (Litman, 2003)  
 A number of incentive-based schemes have been implemented in the 
transportation sector around the world. Although there is some information on the 
impacts of such schemes, there is a need for additional insights on the impacts of 
incentives on traveler behavior. This paper is aimed at using data from an incentive-based 
scheme in The Netherlands to shed light on travelers’ reaction to incentives both during 
and after the end of the reward scheme. The scheme considered in this study is the 
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Spitsmijden (Dutch for peak avoidance) that influenced alternate choice of mode or time 
of travel for daily commute. Participants could choose monetary reward or credits for 
smartphone as compensation for altering their usual commuting behavior. This scheme is 
substantially different compared to other incentive-based studies in terms of project 
continuity and design. This incentive structure is further elaborated in chapter three of the 
thesis. Spitsmijden is an initiative started by a consortium of Dutch businesses, 
universities, and government in 2006 for motiving frequent car users to avoid the peak 
period (Knockaert et al., 2007).  The first experiment was performed over a 13 week 
period in 2006 on the A12 highway for commuters traveling from Hague-Zoetermeer, 
and it is data from this experimental period that is used for the modeling effort in this 
study.   
 The modeling effort in this study is aimed at understanding the role of various 
factors in explaining traveler response to incentive-based interventions. Commuters’ 
usual trip characteristics, availability of alternative travel modes, work-related attributes 
(spatial-temporal flexibility in work arrangements), household constraints as well as 
characteristics, and vehicle availability constraints are all likely to affect departure time 
choice and mode choice.  Including an array of explanatory variables in an appropriate 
model specification would help isolate the impacts of the incentive on traveler choices 
while controlling for other factors. In addition, as the goal of many incentive-based 
programs is to induce a sustained change in traveler behavior, it is necessary to examine 
commuter behavior in the post-reward period.  Accounting for behavioral inertia (where 
individuals attempt to maintain the status quo in their travel choices) is important in the 
implementation of incentive-based strategies. Modeling efforts that can tease out such 
effects would help shed considerable light on this phenomenon that is not well 
understood. Models of traveler choices should attempt to also account for behavioral 
heterogeneity, where the presence of unobserved factors contributes to variance in the 
effects of an observed variable on the dependent variable of interest.  In other words, the 
parameter indicating the effect of a variable on a choice dimension is best represented by 
a distribution with a mean and standard deviation as opposed to a single value.  Such a 
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model specification can account for taste heterogeneity in the population arising from 
unobserved attributes not included in the model. For this reason, the modeling effort in 
this study – aimed at explaining how incentives affect departure time and mode choices – 
utilizes the random parameter panel mixed multinomial logit approach which is capable 
of accounting for repeated observations over time and population heterogeneity.      
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  The next chapter provides an 
overview of pricing and incentive-based strategies. The third chapter describes the 
incentive-based scheme and also provides a brief overview of the data set used in the 
study.  The fourth chapter presents the modeling methodology while the fifth chapter 
provides a discussion of model estimation results.  Conclusions and implications of the 
findings are in the sixth and final chapter of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
2.1. PRICING STRATEGIES FOR TDM   
 
Within the array of pricing-based policies, two broad possible approaches exist.  In one 
approach, a congestion charge is levied to deter individuals from traveling in the peak 
period or along congested corridors.  There are several real-world examples of such 
pricing-based schemes around the world, including the Singapore Central Business 
District congestion charge which reduced morning peak period traffic by 40 percent 
(Phang and Toh, 1997) and the Central London congestion charge which contributed to 
an automobile traffic decline of 20 percent ( Litman, 2006).  While congestion pricing is 
likely to be effective, there has been considerable resistance among the traveling public 
and policymakers to such schemes particularly in the United States (Schaller, 2010).  
New York City’s congestion pricing proposal despite getting widespread public support 
was blocked by the State Legislature showing that opposition to pricing was motivated by 
the negative individual-level impact on car owners. In general, Congestion pricing is 
viewed as having a greater adverse impact on low income segments of the population, 
and contributing to a fall in business activity, system inequities, and pricing inefficiency 
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000).  
 
2.2. INCENTIVES PROVISION FOR TDM   
An alternative approach that has gained considerable attention is the incentive-based 
paradigm where individuals are not priced, but rather travelers are given incentives to 
travel in the off-peak periods or along uncongested corridors.  There are a number of 
success stories of incentives interventions in areas such as smoking cessation (Volpp et 
al., 2009), adoption of safe driving (Dionne et al., 2011), and increased physical activity 
and exercise (Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Along the same line, in transportation 
domain, use of incentive for the travel behavior modification has been explored quite 
recently. In 2003, a controlled study on 43 Kyoto University’s regular car preferring 
students was performed where 23 students were given free bus ticket for a month. The 
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experiment produced evidence of increased frequency of bus usage among treated group 
immediately and after a month after terminating free ticket provision (Fuzi and Kitamura, 
2003). Another set of incentive based experiments in Melbourne (Australia), and Beijing 
(China) that offered reduced or free transit fares for travel outside the peak hours were 
found to be quite effective in reducing rush hour volumes (Currie, 2009 and Zhang et al., 
2014).  In the City of Bangalore, an experiment named INSTANT offered rewards to 
employees of a large IT firm traveling in non-congested time periods. It was observed 
that the number of individuals traveling in less congested periods nearly doubled 
(Merugu et al., 2009).  The 2013 Smartrek initiative in Los Angeles (Hu et al., 2014) 
offered differing levels of reward depending on the time of departure and route used for 
travel in the region.  It was found that, under the reward scheme, 60 percent of program 
participants altered their time of departure, and by doing so they could reduce their travel 
time by nearly 20 percent. Additionally, it was observed that by changing their departure 
time, travelers could reduce their travel time by 19.4% on average. Singapore deployed 
another project called Insinc in 2013 that managed peak demand in Singapore’s subway 
system by rewarding commuters to travel in off-peak time. The overall shift of about 
7.5% of peak trips was observed. This initiative showed that people who had information 
about their friends participating in the program had a better chance of shifting departure 
time (Pluntke and Prabhakar, 2013).  
 
2.3. BEHAVIOR CONTEXT OF INCENTIVES 
 There is considerable literature that explains how and why incentive-based 
strategies influence behavior.  Incentive-based interventions work in the form of a nudge 
or push and have been described by Thaler and Sunstein as an aspect of choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without considerably 
compromising their economic pursuit.  Incentives are generally directed along three key 
dimensions – economic benefits, social benefits, and moral uprightness (Levitt and 
Dubner, 2010).  In the context of travel behavior incentives, it is likely that individuals 
respond to the economic benefits that they may realize and the social benefits that may 
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accrue to their community. These benefits may push people to direct their effort towards 
modifying behavior, adapting to a new routine, and developing a strategy for embracing 
change. One theory that has been proposed to explain the effects of incentives on 
personal effort and adaptation is the goal setting theory. It identifies three possible ways 
in which monetary incentives can take effect: 1) It can induce people to set goals when 
they otherwise would not; 2) It may induce people to set more challenging goals (that 
require higher effort) than they would otherwise; and 3) It may also contribute in greater 
goal commitment than otherwise (Locke et al., 1981).  
Although there is some experience with incentive-based schemes in the 
transportation demand management arena, there is a need for in-depth analysis of the 
impacts of such schemes.  Prior research has been largely descriptive in nature 
(comparing before-and-after statistics, or comparing an experimental group and a control 
group) and has not exploited methodological tools and models capable of shedding 
deeper insights into the effects of incentives on traveler behavior.  More importantly, 
previous research has rarely – if ever – analyzed the long-term (lasting) impacts of the 
incentives once they are eliminated; there is little knowledge of the extent to which 
individuals tend to switch back to their pre-incentive period behavior or continue to 
exhibit the desired change in behavior following the end of the reward or incentive 
period.  In addition, it is important to consider pre-incentive period behavior as part of the 
impact analysis; traveler choices in the pre-incentive period are dependent (endogenous) 




CHAPTER 3: INCENTIVE EXPERIMENT 
 
The Spitsmijden is one of the largest reward based travel demand management (TDM) 
strategies that offer an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of incentives in reducing 
peak period vehicular traffic volumes.  The program was initiated at the end of 2005 by a 
group of Dutch companies, government agencies, and universities in The Netherlands 
with the goal of developing an innovative mechanism to reduce traffic congestion on 
roadways.  
 
3.1 EXPERIMENT DESIGN  
 The pilot program, which is the focus of the current study, was launched in 
October 2006 on Dutch A12 motorway corridor.  Morning commuters driving from 
Zoetermeer towards The Hague were eligible to participate in the program. A detailed 
explanation of the program is available in Knockaert et al. Electronic vehicle 
identification cameras were used to identify vehicles that traversed the roadway of 
interest during the morning rush hours.  Letters were sent to the households 
corresponding to these vehicles, and a total of 340 individuals consented to participate in 
the experiment.  The participants completed an extensive questionnaire about their daily 
commute, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, and work schedules and 
arrangements.  After the end of the program, the participants completed a post-
Spitsmijden experience survey.  The project focused on the reduction of morning peak 
period traffic volumes with the morning peak defined as 7:30-9:30 AM.   
 Participation in the pilot study required a 13-week commitment from participants’ 
side. The first two weeks were devoted to collect data about participants’ pre-reward 
period travel choices. This was necessary because the reward made available to a person 
was dependent on the level and frequency of peak period travel prior to the institution of 
the reward.  The reward period was ten weeks long; during this period, participants could 
take advantage of rewards for avoiding peak period travel in the morning.  The final week 
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was a non-reward period; however, the travel behavior of participants was recorded in 
this final week to determine the extent to which participants reverted to their usual travel 
behavior upon the termination of the reward and the extent to which the reward 
mechanism may have brought about a longer-lasting change in traveler behavior.   
 Choices made by participants were registered using an On Board Unit (OBU) that 
was installed in their vehicles.  Information on routes and time of travel collected by the 
OBU was transmitted automatically to a central database.  Information on mode shifts 
(i.e., participants who chose to work from home or use public transit or non-motorized 
modes during the program period), was logged in a diary that had to be completed by 
every program participant at the end of each day of the program period.   
 
3.2 REWARD STRUCTURE  
 Upon registration, participants were allowed to choose between two reward 
programs.  The first was a monetary reward for avoiding the morning peak period.  The 
second type of reward was the accumulation of credits that could be exchanged for a 
smartphone at the end of the program.  Out of 340 participants, 232 participants went for 
monetary reward scheme while the remainder chose the smartphone (a Yeti phone) 
reward.  Individuals could avail the rewards only if they recorded a net change in 
behavior during the reward period.  In other words, if an individual already avoided peak 
period commuting to a large extent in the pre-reward period, then the individual had to 
further cut his or her peak period commuting and record a net change in peak period 
travel to be eligible for the reward.  
 Each participant who chose the monetary reward scheme experienced three 
reward levels as follows: 1) €3 for avoiding the 7:30-9:30 AM period for three weeks; 2) 
€7 reward for avoiding the 7:30-9:30 AM period for four weeks; and 3) A €3 reward for 
choosing to avoid 8:00-9:00 AM period that increased to €7 if the complete peak period 
of 7:30-9:30 AM was avoided, for three weeks.  Participants of the Yeti phone reward 
group received credits towards keeping the phone that was given to them at the beginning 
of the experiment.  These participants were asked to use the Yeti smartphone for trip 
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guidance and navigation as traffic information was relayed to them through the device.  If 
the person with the phone avoided the morning peak period more than a predetermined 
number of days, then the participant was allowed to keep the phone; otherwise, the phone 
had to be returned at the end of the experiment.  The threshold of the number of days that 
a participant had to avoid was customized to ensure a significant net change in behavior 
between the pre-reward period and the reward period.   
 
3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION  
The data set included 13 weeks of observations of the program participants, yielding a 
total of 22,165 participant-days of observations.  However, after removing records with 
missing data and no information about pre-reward period behavior, and in which the 
participants did not work during the program period, the data set included 16,015 
participant-days of observations.  The final sample includes 324 unique participants of 
whom 208 were men and 116 were women.  Table 1 provides a detailed description of 
the sample and the data used in this study.  More than 85 percent of the sample is 
between the ages of 31 and 60 (the peak working years) and more than one-half of the 
sample has a higher professional and university degree education.  Nearly 60 percent of 
the sample constitutes individuals living with a partner with children and just five percent 
constitute single parents.  Given the nature of the program, all participants own at least 
one car; 47 percent own two cars, and just fewer than four percent own three cars.  
Monthly personal income largely falls in the range of €1500 to €4500.  Out of these 324 
participants, 69 people did not wish to reveal their income in recruiting question survey. 
To account for missing income data and avoid elimination of records due to missing 
income information, their income was imputed using a multivariate imputation by 
chained equation (MICE) methodology (Buuren and Oudshoorn, 2011). Participants’ age, 
gender, education status, family composition and number of cars in the household were 
used as independent variable for the estimating their corresponding income.  
A large percent of the sample (41 percent) indicated that they had no flexibility 
for late arrival at work.  However, more than 50 percent of the sample indicated that they 
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could arrive late to work on more than one day per week, signifying a high level of 
flexibility among the commuters in the sample.  Only 12 percent indicated that they had 
to wait for others before starting work in the event that they arrive early at work.  Nearly 
three-quarters of the sample could not telework, while 20 percent of the sample could 
telework one day of the week.  Among trip related characteristics, more than 50 percent 
of the sample indicated that they were constrained and could not depart to work early.  
The difference between congested and uncongested travel times was more than 30 
minutes for 22.2 percent of the sample, indicating that a large percent of commuters 
could save substantial travel time by shifting to an uncongested travel period.   
 Two-thirds of the sample chose the monetary reward.  In terms of reward class, 55 
percent of the sample could collect a reward on all five days of the week (based on their 
pre-reward period behavior).  Only 6.4 percent of the sample was limited to collecting the 
reward on one day of the week; these individuals presumably traveled four of the five 
days each week during the off-peak period in the pre-reward period.  Thus, they were 
eligible for the reward on only one day of the week that would constitute a net change in 
behavior.  Among participants who chose the Yeti smartphone, nearly 43 percent had to 
avoid morning rush hours on at least 15 days over a 5-week program period to keep the 
phone.  About 8.5 percent of the Yeti phone sample had to avoid the peak period on all 
25 days of the five-week period to retain the smartphone.  These thresholds were set 
based on the usual behavior exhibited by the participants during the two-week pre-reward 
period.   
 Finally, table 5 shows the shares of alternatives in the data set that comprises 
16,015 observation-days.  In the pre-reward period, 23.4 percent of the participants drove 
before the rush hours, 46.8 percent traveled during rush hours, and 17.5 percent traveled 
after the rush hours.  The remaining individuals used alternative modes or worked from 
home.  The reward period shows considerable changes in travel behavior.  During the 
reward period, 37 percent traveled before the peak period, only 20 percent (down from 
46.8) traveled during the rush hours, and 18.7 percent traveled after the peak period.  The 
percent of individuals using alternative modes or working from home increased from 16 
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percent in the pre-reward period to about 24 percent in the reward period. However, it 
appears that individuals quickly revert to their pre-reward period behavior once the 
incentives are eliminated. Behavior in the post-reward period largely mirrors the behavior 
in the pre-reward period, with a very modest drop in peak period travel (from 46.8 
percent to 45.7 percent).  The share of bicycle travel dropped from 4.5 percent to 1.5 
percent, while the share of public transportation use climbed from 4.7 percent to 6.6 
percent.  There is therefore some indication of a sustained, albeit modest, change in 
















CHAPTER 4: MODEL FORMULATION 
In this study, a random parameter panel mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) for departure 
time choice/mode choice analysis is adopted. Panel MMNL is used to accommodate 
heterogeneity across individuals due to both observed and unobserved attributes. For the 
discussion of the model structure, consider the indices ),...,2,1( Qqq = for individual 
decision maker, i for the available alternative (i = 1, 2, …, I) and t for the choice 
occasion, with a maximum of 65 choice occasions available for 65 days1, ( t = 1, 2, .., T ).  
Following the traditional utility maximizing models for choices analysis, the 
utility qitU  that an individual q associates with alternative i on choice occasion t may be 
written as follows: 
itqitqqit xvU εβ +ʹ+ʹ= )(                                                                                                    (1) 
where qitx  is a (M×1)-column vector of exogenous variables such as individual specific  
attributes and their trip characteristics, individuals’ work-related attributes, and rewards 
for rush-hour avoidance, which affect the utility of alternative i  for individual q at tth 
choice occasion. β   is a corresponding (M×1) column vector of mean effects of the 
coefficients of qitx  on alternative choice propensity, and qv  is (M×1) column vector with 
its thm element representing unobserved factors specific to individual q and her/his trip-
work related factors that control the influence of the corresponding thm  element of the 
vector qitx . The elements of the qv  vector are assumed to be independently drawn from a 
normal distribution; ),0(~ 2mqm Nv σ . itε  represents a choice-occasion specific random 
error term assumed to be identically and independently standard Gumbel distributed 
across all individuals. 
For a given value of the vector qv , the probability that individual q will choose 
alternative i at tth choice occasion can be written in the usual multinomial logit form: 
                                                   
1 65 observation days are not available for every participant as some participants were on leave or did not 
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∫= F                                                                                                (3) 
where F is the multivariate cumulative normal distribution and σ  is a vector that stacks 
up the mσ  elements across all m (independence of the elements of qv is assumed). The 
dimensionality in the integration above is dependent on the number of elements in the qv  
vector. 
 The parameters to be estimated in the model of Equation (3) are β  and σ  
vectors.  To develop the likelihood function for parameter estimation, the probability of 
each individuals’ observed choices across all time occasions is needed. Conditional on qv , 


















|)|( δβ ,                                                                                    (4) 
where qitδ  is a dummy variable taking the value of ‘1’ if the q
th individual chooses the ith  
choice alternative on the tth occasion, and ‘0’ otherwise. The unconditional likelihood 
function for individual q’s observed set of choices is: 
∫=
qv
qqqq vdFvLL )|()|(),( σβσβ                                                                                       (5) 
The log-likelihood function is ).,(ln),( σβσβ qq LL ∑=  Since this equation 
does not have a closed-form solution, a maximum simulated likelihood approach has 
been adopted to solve for the model parameters. In simulated likelihood approach, the 
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where rw is the column vector of Halton pseudo-random draws (250 draws were used for 
this estimation). Halton draws were used to approximate the integrals in the likelihood 
function and maximize the logarithm of the resulting simulated likelihood function across 
all individuals with respect to the parameters β and σ . Details of the Halton sequence 








CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
The variables selected for inclusion in the model specification are based on research 
reported in the literature and the behavioral intuitiveness of model coefficients.  For 
understanding the impact of the reward, dummy variables representing reward categories 
are included in the utility of all alternatives.  The base alternative is taken to be travel 
before peak period.  For the reward, five different dummy variables are defined 
representing €3, €7, €3-€7, credits for phone, and no credits-but with traffic information. 
These dummy variables assume the value of zero in pre- and post-reward periods and 
assume the value of one in the reward period.  In this study, the data is modeled in a joint 
fashion, stacking the observations of the pre-reward period, reward period, and post-
reward period respectively for each participant.  Unobserved factors’ endogeneity that 
affect pre-reward behavior also influence participants’ reward period and post-reward 
behaviors, and the reward class (level) to which they belong. 
 
5.1 UNDERESTIMATION OF UNOBSERVED FACTORS  
Consider an individual who is very schedule oriented (independent of work time 
flexibility) compared to observationally equivalent peers, and strictly follows a regimen 
that is intrinsically aligned with usual workday timings.  For this individual, this 
unobserved attribute may contribute to his or her traveling in the pre-reward period 
exclusively during the rush hours.  As a result, this individual is eligible for the highest 
reward class. If the pre-reward choices are considered exogenous in the modeling of 
reward period choices, then individuals with a strong schedule orientation (which is 
unobserved) will be probable to get a higher reward, while individuals with a relaxed 
schedule orientation (and do not travel exclusively in the rush hours in the pre-reward 
period) will be assigned to receive a lower reward.  That is, individuals who are 
intrinsically unlikely to change schedules are presented with a high reward while 
individuals with a higher proclivity to change schedules are presented with a low reward. 
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The net result, if the pre-reward choices are considered entirely exogenous in reward 
period choices, would be an underestimation of the effect of the reward on changing to 
off-peak period travel.  The way to address this is to consider the pre-reward period 
choices as being endogenous to the reward period choices, and model the choices for 
these different periods jointly to accommodate the unobserved rigid (or flexible) schedule 
orientation of individuals.  By controlling for this endogeneity, it is possible to get 
econometrically consistent estimates of the effect of the reward on the likelihood to shift 
to off-peak periods of travel.  The same argument can be extended to other potential 
unobserved factors (e.g., sensitivity to travel time, constraints at home or work) that 
contribute to endogeneity of pre-reward choices.  
 
5.2 INERTIA 
To examine how the behavior of participants changed in response to the 
temporary availability of a reward, a dummy variable is added to the specification.  This 
variable takes a value of zero for the pre-reward and reward periods, and a value of one in 
the post-reward period.  To explore differential impacts of rewards across gender, 
income, and age, multiple interaction variables were included and tested for significance. 
This inertia vector for each person was calculated by accounting total choice occasions 
available to a person in the pre-reward period. So, for an observation-day, the inertia 
effect was included in the utility equations for a person as RPRtiqiq dBRCRInertia ×= , 
where iqBRCR is the before reward-period choice ratio of individual q for alternative i. 
The dummy variable RPRtd  takes the value of one if the choice occasion is in reward or 
before-reward periods and zero otherwise. A positive sign is expected on the inertia 
variable for all alternatives.  
 
5.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Model estimation results are presented in Table 6.  In light of the large number of 
parameters in the model, a brief overview of key findings is provided in this chapter. The 
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constant term suggests that individuals are inclined to travel during the rush hour as 
evidenced by the positive coefficient, and to a lesser degree by public transportation and 
bicycle (where they can avail of the reward even when traveling during rush hours). The 
significant standard deviations on the random parameters (constants) for shared-ride and 
work from home suggest there are unobserved factors contributing to preference 
heterogeneity for these alternatives. For example, gregarious individuals may be inclined 
to carpool; and individuals who are employed in specific occupation types may be 
inclined to work from home. 
 
5.3.1 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Among individual characteristics, females are less likely to travel after the rush 
hour or via carpool with family and friends. In terms of education, those with lower 
levels of education are more likely to travel after the rush hours, possibly due to lower 
paying jobs that are part time or contractual in nature and afford schedule flexibility.  
They are also more likely to share a ride, presumably due to vehicle ownership 
constraints.  On the other hand, they are less likely to use public transit; the significant 
standard deviations on these random parameters suggest the presence of unobserved 
factors affecting preference for transit.  It is possible that these individuals live and work 
in locations that are not well served by transit.  Somewhat consistent with these results is 
the finding that lower income individuals are more likely to share a ride and less likely to 
ride transit. Those in the peak working age (30-60 years) are less likely to travel in rush 
hours, less likely to share a ride, and less likely to use public transit.  However, there is 
significant preference heterogeneity when it comes to rush hour driving and use of public 
transportation, possibly due to spatial effects and household and work constraints.  
Individuals living in households without children appear to enjoy a less 
constrained lifestyle as they eschew driving in rush hour, sharing a ride with others, and 
using public transit.  On the other hand, single parents – who may be very schedule 
constrained – drive in rush hours and after rush hours (perhaps after dropping off a child 
at school), and are more likely to use transit and bike modes.  Single parents may also be 
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more responsive to the reward scheme due to financial constraints, and are hence more 
likely to shift mode of transport in the reward and post-reward periods.  However, there is 
considerable preference heterogeneity exhibited by single parents. Additionally, higher 
level of household car ownership is associated with reduced proclivity for rush hour 
driving, propensity to share a ride and use of public transit; the flexibility that higher car 
ownership levels afford explain these results. 
 
5.3.2 WORK COMMUTE CHARACTERISTICS  
Individuals with limited arrival time flexibility are more likely to travel before or 
during rush hours that is consistent with expectations. They are also more likely to travel 
by shared ride, public transit, and bicycle – signifying their desire to arrive on time at 
work by any mode possible.  Those who can start work even if they arrive early are more 
likely to drive in the rush hours or share a ride (and thus arrive early or on time). As 
expected, those who can telecommute are inclined to do so. Individuals who cannot 
depart early (due to home constraints) are likely to avoid the peak period and travel after 
the peak period.   
It is interesting to note that individuals, who have less than 20 minutes usual 
travel time differential between congested and uncongested periods, are less likely to use 
alternative modes such as shared ride and public transit; this is consistent with 
expectations because driving is an acceptable proposition when congested conditions are 
not terribly worse than uncongested conditions.  Such individuals are more likely to 
travel in the after-rush hour period and use bicycle, findings that are worthy of further 
exploration.        
 Inertial effects are strong and significant.  As expected, all coefficients are 
positive – indicating the substantial presence of inertial effects that reinforce the 
continuation of past behavior as long as it is not disturbed.  The one negative coefficient 
(albeit statistically insignificant) is associated with peak period driving; this coefficient is 
negative because the inertial effect is shaken by virtue of the multi-week reward period.  
In the reward period (that dominates the data set), many travelers were incentivized to 
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shift their time or mode of travel; in other words, inertia – although clearly present – was 
overcome and had no impact during the reward period for this particular alternative as 
large number of program participants changed their behavior (from traveling in peak 
period by car). 
 
5.3.3 IMPACT OF REWARDS  
The rewards contribute to a reduced proclivity to travel during the peak period as 
evidenced by the negative coefficients in the utility equation of that alternative. Provision 
of traffic information and the third monetary reward category contribute positively to 
public transit use, and negatively to bicycle use. The large monetary incentive of €7 also 
contributed negatively to working from home scenario. It is likely that the shift from car 
to public transit is easier than a shift from car to bicycle or work from home. Interaction 
variables suggest that there is considerable variation in the effect of the reward across 
socio-economic groups.  Those with high income respond to higher levels of monetary 
incentives (€7) compared to other incentive levels.  The effects are more pronounced for 
individuals at lower income levels, suggesting that lower income individuals exhibit 
greater elasticity of behavior in response to reward incentives (as expected).  Females are 
likely to shift to public transportation at high levels monetary incentive (€7), but not 
likely to do so for credits towards a phone.  On the other hand, they appear more inclined 
to work from home when armed with traffic information.   
 The variable “post reward behavior” signifies the extent to which participants 
continued their reward-period behavior after the termination of the reward. Evidently, 
there is a strong proclivity to resume rush hour driving after the termination of the reward 
period. It is possible that the reward was sufficient for many to consider a temporary 
disruption in their schedule and household logistics, but the alternative choices were not 
considered superior to driving during rush hours in the absence of the reward.  In 
addition, as seen in Table 5, it appears that some participants may have shifted to public 
transportation and some bicycle riders may have shifted to off-peak driving.   
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The model shows a strong goodness of fit.  A simple multinomial logit model 
(MNL) with constants-only had a mean log-likelihood value of -23471 while the simple 
multinomial logit choice model with variables had a log-likelihood value of -18593.9, 
indicating a significant improvement in fit attributable to the explanatory variables.  
However, the mixed panel multinomial logit model (MMNL) presented in Table 6 has a 
log-likelihood value of -18442.16, which is a further significant improvement over the 
simple multinomial logit model.  A usefulness goodness-of-fit statistic is:   
2




which is 0.2107, a value that is consistent with disaggregate choice models of this nature. 
The likelihood ratio test between restricted MNL and non-restricted MMNL models is:  
 -2[-18593.9 - (-18442.16)] = 303.48. 
The value of 303.48 is far greater than the critical 2χ value of 18.48 with seven 
degrees of freedom at 99 percent confidence level.  This suggests that there is significant 
preference heterogeneity due to unobserved factors in how individuals of different socio-




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
 
Incentive-based schemes are being increasingly considered around the world to help 
manage travel demand, particularly during peak periods, and bring about changes in 
traveler choices towards more sustainable modes of transport, less congested times of 
travel, and less congested corridors.  Although there is some descriptive information on 
the impacts of incentive-based travel demand management strategies, there is a need for 
additional evidence on the impacts of such schemes on traveler behavior.  It is necessary 
to be able to isolate the effects of reward-based strategies on traveler behavior while 
controlling for other explanatory factors, accounting for variations in effects across socio-
economic groups, and accommodating for the presence of individual taste heterogeneity 
due to unobserved attributes.  There is a paucity of modeling efforts that can provide deep 
and rich insights into these aspects of the impacts of reward-based travel demand 
management strategies.   
 This study aims to fill this need by offering a mixed panel multinomial logit 
model of the effects of a reward based scheme on peak period vehicular travel.  The study 
is based on data collected in the Spitsmijden (Dutch for peak period avoidance) program 
conducted in The Netherlands.  Travel behavior data of 324 participants from the initial 
experiment (conducted in 2006) is used in this study. Participants’ travel behavior was 
measured during a pre-reward period of two weeks, during a reward period of 10 weeks, 
and during a post-reward period of one week.  About two-thirds of the participants opted 
for monetary-based incentives while one-third chose a smartphone credit- or traffic-
information based incentive. The modeling methodology treats the pre-reward traveler 
choices as endogenous to reward-period travel choices, thus recognizing that the level of 
reward that an individual can attain is dependent on their usual (pre-reward) travel 
behavior.   
 The mixed multinomial logit model offers deep insights into the effects of various 
factors on traveler behavior in response to rewards.  As expected, socio-economic factors, 
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work attributes, and trip characteristics (degree of flexibility) affect traveler response to 
incentives.  The level of incentive is also quite significant in explaining the choice of 
alternative, with higher levels of incentive more likely to induce a desirable change in 
behavior.  It is found that inertia plays a significant role in human travel behavior; in 
general, participants exhibited a high degree of inertia where they tended to continue 
exercising the same travel choices unless the incentive made it worthwhile to get out of 
their comfort zone. The incentive was able to overcome the inertia associated with 
traveling in the peak period.  Also, it is found that the incentive based scheme was not 
sufficient to bring about lasting changes in behavior.  Within just one week of the 
termination of the reward program, travelers reverted largely to their pre-reward period 
behavior – particularly with respect to driving in the rush hours.  It is clear that many 
individuals travel during the rush hours because that routine fits within the overall 
schedule of their household and work life; while the incentive motivated individuals to 
disturb that equilibrium and accept an alternate routine for a temporary period (when they 
reaped the rewards), the inconvenience of changing behavior was substantial enough to 
induce them to largely return to their usual pre-reward period behavior.   
 The moral of the story is that a temporary incentive may not be effective in 
bringing about a sustained long term change in traveler behavior.  Clearly the monetary 
incentives are effective, because behavior changed significantly during the reward period.  
The question is: how can this change be sustained over time after the reward systems are 
removed? The answer to this question merits considerable additional research; focus 
group sessions and post-experiment surveys that collect data on why individuals revert to 
their original behavior would provide valuable insights to answer this question.  
Incentives may have to be provided for a longer (to be determined) period of time so that 
individuals get used to a new routine and home/work life arrangement; once they fall into 
a new (presumably satisfactory) routine, then it is likely that the changes will stick 
because of inertia effects and because the cost to change routine once again would be 
greater than the value of the incentive that is being eliminated.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Socio demographic composition 
 
Variables Share % 
Individual and Household Characteristics  Gender  Male 64.2 
Female 38.8 
Age  20 – 30 11.4 
31 – 45 46.6 
46 – 60 40.1 
More than 60 1.9 
Level of education  Pre-vocational secondary education  10.2 
Lower vocational education  4.3 
Upper secondary vocational education 29.0 
Higher professional /university degree 56.5 
Marital status  
Single 13.3 
Living with partner without children 22.5 
Living with partner with children  57.4 
Single parent 4.9 
Other 1.9 
Number of cars  One 49.1 
Two 47.2 
Three 3.7 
Monthly personal income level  
Less than 1,500€ 6.5 
Between 1500€ to 3000€  51.2 
Between 3000€ to 4500€ 37.4 
More than 4500€ 4.9 
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Table 2: Commute characteristic 
 
Trip Related Characteristics  Share % 
Early departure constraint from home   
Can depart early  46.1 
Cannot depart early  53.9 
Travel time diff (congested and uncongested)    
Less than 20 minutes  38.8 
Between 20 minutes and 30 minutes  38.8 




Table 3: work-place variables  
 
 
Variables Share % 
Work Related Characteristics   Number of days allowed  for late arrival  Zero 41.0 
One 5.2 
More than one  53.8 
Amount of time allowed for late arrival   
Less than 20 minutes 43.8 
Between 20 and 45 minutes  13.3 
More than 45 minutes  42.9 
Office situation - if early arrived  
Can start work and make preparation  88.0 
Can’t start work/wait for other 12.0 
Number of days allowed for teleworking   
Zero 74.1 
One  20.4 
















Table 4: Level of rewards 
 
 
Reward Distribution Share % 
Reward type  
Monetary  67.3 
Smartphone  32.7 
1. Reward class(Monetary)  
A [5]* 55.4 
B [4] 27.5 
C [2] 10.5 
D [1] 6.4 
* maximum number of reward-days per week 
2. Reward class (Smartphone)  
A [15]** 42.5 
B [20] 29.4 
C [23] 19.9 
D [25] 8.6 





















Share of Alternatives for Observation-Days (%) 





Driving before rush hour (Base) 34.2 23.4 37.2 24.9 
Driving during rush hour 25.9 46.8 20.0 45.7 
Driving after rush hour  17.5 13.3 18.7 13.9 
Using carpool/ family-friend carshare 5.3 4.4 5.5 4.4 
Avoiding rush hour by using public 
transportation 10.3 4.7 11.7 6.6 
Avoiding rush hour by using bike 3.0 4.5 2.9 1.5 
Working from home  3.8 2.9 4.0 3.0 
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TABLE 6:  Model Estimation Results 






Bike  Work From Home  
Estimate  t-stat Estimate  t-stat Estimate  t-stat Estimate  t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate  t-stat 
Constant 0.9264 7.19 -0.3466 -3.42 -7.6790 -7.29 0.3850 1.12 0.3165 1.87 -15.1605 -5.72 
Constant (std dev)     3.0497 6.90     7.8293 6.04 
Individual and Hhold Characteristics             
Gender (Male is base)  
Female   -0.4292 -7.22 -1.1258 -4.96       
Education  (University degree is base) 
Secondary education   0.6478 8.16 0.7675 3.14 -0.5788 -2.80 -0.5339 -2.75   
Secondary education (std dev)       3.6050 8.01     
Lower vocational education   0.6478 8.16 0.7675 3.14 -0.5788 -2.80 -0.5339 -2.75   
Lower vocational education (std dev)       3.6050 8.01     
Secondary vocation education   0.4950 8.43   -0.5788 -2.80     
Secondary vocation education (std dev)       3.6050 8.01     
Monthly Income  (Between €1500-€3000 is base) 
Less than  €1500     0.8580 1.72 -3.167 -4.61     
Less than  €1500 (std dev)     2.5063 3.87       
Family Composition (Living with partner and children is base) 
Single              
Living with partner without children -0.4311 -8.21   -0.4311 -8.21 -0.5379 -3.51     
Single parent  0.8276 6.24 1.4298 7.90   1.4298 7.90 1.5241 4.45   
Single parent (std dev)   0.4939 2.63   0.4939 2.63     
Age of the individuals (Between 20-30 years is base) 
30-45 year  -0.4661 -6.92   -0.5149 -2.51 -0.7523 -3.50     
30-45 year (std dev) 0.0744 2.18     1.5581 4.96     
45-60 year -0.4661 -6.92   -0.5149 -2.51 -0.7523 -3.50 -1.1307 -6.56   
45-60 year (std dev) 0.0744 2.18     1.5581 4.96     
Number of cars (Count (1-3)) -0.0447 -1.17   1.0443 5.59 -0.2255 -1.86     
Work Related Characteristics             
Late arrival time allowed (more than 20 minutes is base) 
Less than 20 minutes   -0.9995 -16.93 0.8083 8.28 0.8083 8.28 0.8083 8.28   
Office situation – if early arrived (cannot start early/waiting is base) 
Can start work 0.4355 5.07 -0.2355 -2.83 1.5681 4.56 -0.6347 -2.59     
Number of Teleworking days (zero is the base) 
One           4.7080 5.95 
More than one           8.9533 6.65 
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TABLE 6:  Model Estimation Results (continued) 





Transportation Bike Work From Home 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Early departure from home constraints (can depart early is base) 
Cannot depart early  -0.3819 -8.14 0.1368 2.44         
Travel time difference between congested and non-congested trip (more than 20 minutes is base) 
Less than 20 minutes   0.1945 3.63 -0.9171 -4.59  -0.3903  -2.87 0.2742 2.10   
Inertia -0.0268 -0.45 3.5068 29.02 11.5141 9.08   4.6193   8.88 3.1802 8.03 9.7472 4.44 
Inertia for before rush hour driving as this is alternative specific                 Estimate: 2.9405   t-stat: 40.39 
Post reward behavior 0.8939 11.91       -0.9122 -2.85   
Interactions             
Female * inertia     -2.1523 -5.47  -2.3138  -5.07 -2.1523 -5.47 5.2292 2.28 
Age (>45years) * inertia   -0.5740 -3.57     3.4704 6.75 -2.7548 -5.89   
Reward             
Monetary and Smartphone (€3 is base)             
€7 -0.7477 -11.89       -0.8533 -5.56 -0.8681 -1.97 
€3-€7 where €7 is for peak of the peak -0.7377 -10.57     0.3786 2.29 -0.7148 -3.96   
Smartphone credits             
No credits (Traffic information) -0.6178 -7.78     0.6753 4.10 -0.4554 -1.54   
             
Interaction (Reward * inc >€4500)             
€3,smartphone,no credit is the base             
€7 -0.5672 -2.08   -1.2710 -1.42 0.9963 3.18     
€3-€7 where €7 for peak of the peak -0.5874 -1.75     0.9963 3.18     
             
Interaction (Reward * inc >€1500)             
€3,smartphone, no credit is the base             
€7 -1.0702 -3.19     3.3008 3.46     
€3-€7 where €7 for peak of the peak -1.1627 -2.82     3.2718 3.51     
             
Interaction (Reward * Female)             
€3, smartphone, no credit is the base             
€7       0.9711 4.19     
€3-€7 where €7 for peak of the peak             
Smartphone credits       -2.1745 -3.92     
No credits (Traffic information)           2.3975 2.73 
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